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In a Data-centric Delay Tolerant Networks(DTNs), it is essential for nodes to 
cooperate in message forwarding in order to enable successful delivery of a message in an 
opportunistic fashion with nodes having their social interests defined. In the data-centric 
dissemination protocol proposed here, a source annotates messages(images) with 
keywords, and then intermediate nodes are presented with an option of adding keyword-
based annotations in order to create higher content strength messages on path toward the 
destination. Hence, contents like images get enriched as there is situation evolution or 
learned by these intermediate nodes, such as in a battlefield, or in a disaster situation. Nodes 
might turn selfish and not participate in relaying messages due to relative scarcity of battery 
and storage capacity in mobile devices. Therefore, in addition to content enrichment, an 
incentive mechanism is proposed in this thesis which considers factors like message 
quality, battery usage, level of interests, etc for the calculation of incentives. Moreover, 
with the goal of preventing the nodes from turning malicious by adding inappropriate 
message tags in the quest of acquiring more incentive, a distributed reputation model 
(DRM) is developed and consolidated with the proposed incentive scheme. DRM takes 
into account inputs from multiple users like ratings for the relevance of annotations in the 
message, message quality, etc. The proposed scheme safeguards the network from 
congestion due to uncooperative or selfish nodes in the system. The performance 
evaluation shows that our approach delivers more high priority and high quality messages 
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The ever-rising use of mobile devices in the world has made it possible to form a 
highly effective and efficient mobile p2p network. The concept of delay tolerant networks 
was introduced because of the lack of infrastructure in disaster affected areas and extra-
terrestrial networks. Due to the realization that it is not possible to deliver messages 
instantaneously in such scenarios, algorithms that allow the incorporation of the delay were 
developed. NASA and other organizations were funded to develop a proposal for 
Interplanetary Internet(IPN). The initial architecture was proposed keeping in mind the 
significant delays and packet corruption in deep space communications. Over time, some 
of the ideas proposed for IPN were adapted to and the term “delay-tolerant networking” 
was coined. 
The causes for disruption can be limits of wireless radio range, sparsity of mobile 
nodes, energy resources, attack, and noise. To counteract these challenges, routing 
protocols were proposed. One of the first few protocols defined was epidemic 
dissemination of data. In this protocol, every device transmits all the data possessed to 
every other encountered device and vice-versa. Although this algorithm achieves the 
highest delivery ratio, the overhead it imposes is huge. This overhead is measured in terms 
of energy consumption and used data space at the node level and overall traffic at the 
network level. Other routing mechanisms were therefore proposed and implemented in 
different scenarios by taking into account the suitability of trade-off between throughput 
and overhead. 
As time evolved, researchers realized that the problems faced in disruption tolerant 
networks appear in many other scenarios. Therefore, issues involved in vehicular ad-hoc 
networks, rural communication, conferences, etc. can also be solved by the DTN 
architecture.  
Figure 1.1 below shows the architecture of DTN. Nodes can be stationary or 
mobile. A DTN node shares the data with another node when a successful connection is 
established. When an intermittent link goes down, it another path can be used to deliver a 
message. Multiple paths can therefore be used to share the message. This is why it is also 






Figure 1.1. DTN Architecture 
The following subsection defines routing. 
1.1. ROUTING IN DTN 
As the traditional routing algorithms like Open shortest path first(OSPF), Gateway 
Routing Protocol(GTP) cannot be used directly in DTNs because they require a continuous 
end-to-end connectivity, other schemes have been proposed. Broadly, the algorithms can 
be classified as node-centric and data-centric. Node-centric algorithms are further 
classified as flooding-based  and forwarding-based. 
A few examples of flooding-based are Epidemic, Direct-contact, Two-hop-relay, 
and Spray-and-Wait. In Direct-Contact routing algorithm, the source node directly 
forwards a bundle to the destination node. Some variants of epidemic routing are priority-
based and immunity-based. In two-hop relay, a message will be delivered to destination if 
source and destination are within two-hops reachability. In Spray-and-Wait, replicas of a 
message are distributed to an optimal number of nodes rather than all the nodes. This can 
also be considered another variant of Epidemic routing. 
Some of the forwarding-based algorithms are NECTAR, Source Routing, and Per-
Hop routing. NECTAR maintains a neighborhood index table at each node which stores 
the information about the meeting frequency of encountering nodes in the network. Nodes 
with higher index are forwarded bundles. Source Routing has two phases, viz., route 




to destination with intermediate nodes appending its address in the discovery packet. Route 
maintenance phase throws a route error when a link is broken. In per-hop routing, decisions 
about forwarding to the next hop are made individually by each node. The next subsection 
defines data-centric routing. 
 
1.2. DATA-CENTRIC ROUTING 
Given a vast amount of information to disseminate, it is important to prioritize the 
data delivery to the data which is relevant to the nodes. Therefore, it makes more sense for 
the nodes to analyze the content of the received bundles before making decisions about the 
next hop to forward rather than just blindly forwarding the data without knowing the data 
itself. A security issue of what if a relay uses the received data for malicious purposes 
arises. In such cases, data can be encrypted but a set of metadata keywords can be defined 
to tag the data with.  
Data-centric routing was proposed to further reduce the overhead in the network 
while also giving a reasonable throughput with only the relevant contextual data being 
forwarded and ultimately delivered. Examples of Data-centric routing algorithms are 
CEDO[1] and ChitChat[2].  
CEDO is acronym for Content Centric Dissemination algorithm. It solves the 
problem of how nodes should replicate content so that the network throughput is 
maximized. The idea is to allow nodes to make requests for content at random times. The 
request is tagged with TTL, which when expires, the request is deleted from the entire 
network. If a node m comes in contact with node n and node n has content in its buffer that 
m requested, m can retrieve the content from node n. 
ChitChat, on the other hand, is a bit intricate and sophisticated compared to CEDO. 
Every node has predefined interests that act as subscription keywords. Keywords are 
mapped with the corresponding strength which rises or falls depending upon the 
encountering nodes’ keyword strengths. When a node m encounters node n, node m decides 
to forward the content possessed by it to node n if the keyword strength in n for the content 






Having the most efficient and effective routing mechanism in place does not mean 
that the nodes will start cooperating with each other in the process of relaying. This is 
owing to the fact that the mobile nodes have limited battery power and also relatively small 
storage space for storing the in-transit messages.  
The main problem we solve in this paper are of identification of selfish nodes and 
eliminating the traffic due to them. We introduce a concept of content-enrichment as well 
which allows the nodes to make the in-transit packets richer in metadata information. Apart 
from this, there is a need for a reputation based mechanism. All these three problems and 
their novel solutions are described briefly in the subsections below: 
1.3.1. Need to Identify Selfish Nodes. Selfish nodes are defined as the nodes which 
either refuse from receiving incoming packets for relaying, dropping existing packets even 
before the time-to-live(TTL) is not over and the message has not been forwarded, and 
denial of participation in relaying the acquired messages. An important characteristic of 
such nodes is that they receive the messages intended for them and not receive the messages 
for relaying.  This might be accomplished by switching on the communication medium 
when in need and switch it off when not. The existence of these category of nodes is a very 
serious problem in delay tolerant networks because these networks rely on nodes 
forwarding the data to the encountered hops. If the message bundles are not forwarded to 
the encountered nodes, this might result in unsuccessful delivery of those bundles.  
We have therefore defined an incentive mechanism which motivates all nodes to 
participate in the message transactions. This mechanism ensures fairness to all the devices. 
The developed mechanism is primarily based on credit-based. Every nodes is assigned a 
pre-defined number of tokens initially. All nodes are assigned the same number of tokens. 
They can then use these tokens to pay as compensation for message transactions. 
Consider a scenario of a selfish node which receives the messages it wants and does 
not participate in forwarding. In this case, the selfish node will end up paying all of its 
assigned incentive tokens and be left with zero tokens eventually. Unless the node 




will not be able to receive the interesting content. Therefore, the traffic due to those selfish 
nodes will be curbed. 
1.3.2. Content Enrichment. Consider a scenario where nodes can take a peek into 
the data being relayed by them and happen to have supplementary information about the 
content. If the metadata with which this bundle is tagged does not reflect the above 
additional information about the content of the bundle, it makes sense for these relay nodes 
to add more metadata keywords. There is, therefore, an elevated possibility for the number 
of destinations to be risen. Additionally, the added information can help the nodes to have 
a much better situational awareness. This adding of metadata keywords is what we call 
content enrichment. 
The question which needs to be addressed is why a user might be feeling generous 
enough to enrich the content. In other words, what is the profit of a user who is adding 
more metadata keywords? A rational user adding the keywords cannot be certain that other 
users will do the same. Therefore, even the generous users might lose the motivation to do 
so. In order to facilitate the content enrichment, we define in the scheme that the user 
adding relevant metadata keywords can attain more incentive tokens from the destination 
than what were promised to it by the sender. This scheme ensures fairness and validates 
that the users are paid proportionately to their contribution. 
1.3.3. Distributed Reputation Model. Malicious nodes are defined as the ones 
which either generate poor quality messages or add irrelevant keywords to the passing 
bundle. The motivation behind this behavior can be to gain higher incentive tokens. For 
example, consider a node which acquired a message consisting of an image of a tree tagged 
with the keyword “tree”. Based on our content enrichment scheme, this node can add more 
irrelevant keywords. Let us say the node adds keywords “car”, “books” and “building”. Let 
us say this malicious node delivers the message to the nodes having the subscription 
keywords “car” and “building”. Since the message transaction is automatic, the 
destinations for the delivered messages provide extra incentive to the malicious nodes. The 
mobile node is limited with computational power and memory, it definitely cannot execute 
the machine learning algorithms on its own. Therefore, user intervention is required to 





A user can make decisions about quality of message and relevance of the additional 
keyword annotations post-reception. Therefore, a rating can be added for individual nodes 
and then shared with other nodes in order to spread the reputation of the nodes network 
wide and enabling other nodes to avoid receiving from malicious nodes. Furthermore, the 
decisions of incentive awarding are done by taking into consideration of the reputation of 
nodes. In our approach, a percentage of incentive is provided to deliverers with reputation 





2. RELATED WORK 
There has been sizable amount of work on Incentive mechanism in Delay Tolerant 
Networks. Since the incentive mechanisms that we have developed is based on credit and 
reputation, it is important to note down those kinds of previous and related works. Thus, 
the following subsections manifest these two types of work in detail: 
2.1. CREDIT BASED INCENTIVE MECHANISM 
These kind of incentive mechanisms are based on rewarding nodes for generating 
or relaying messages. There are two broad classification in these: i) where source pays the 
incentive tokens, and ii) where destination pays incentive tokens for the relayed message. 
Mobicent[3],PI[4],[5], MuRIS[6], TFT[7] are some of the works that are related to 
varying degrees with credit-based work in the proposed scheme in this thesis.  
In MobiCent, client’s payments and the relays’ rewards are set with a goal that 
nodes will behave truthfully. Therefore, packets will always be forwarded by nodes without 
adding phantom links, and the nodes will not let the contact opportunity go to waste unless 
the reward is not adequate or the decisions of the underlying mechanism dictate that. The 
underlying routing protocol will find the best available path for a message delivery. There 
are three kinds of nodes in the Mobicent architecture: i) Trusted third party which stores 
key information for all nodes and provides verification and payment services. ii) Helpers, 
which are static or mobile nodes, relay content via short range, high speed and intermittent 
communication links. iii) Mobile clients that are the destinations which have high-
bandwidth intermittent links for data transfer and highly available but low bit rate links for 
control messages.  
In PI, a source attaches an attractive as well as fair incentive to a bundle. In this 
system, there is a trusted authority(TA) which does not participate in bundle forwarding 
but rather it performs clearance of credit and reputation for DTN nodes. Every DTN node 
before joining the network registers itself with the TA to get its personal credit 
account(PCA) and a personal reputation account(PRA).When a node later establishes a 




intermediate node when participates in bundle forwarding, it can get credits from the 
source. At the same time, it can get reputation from the TA. Therefore, PI relies on a 
centralized trusted authority for reputation management.  
In [5], the authors have defined a two-hop scheme in which a source generates a 
message, forwards it to a relay along with a promise of incentive and a relay when 
delivering a message receives the promised incentive from the destination. They have three 
settings that they evaluate based on two parameters: i) Number of circulated copies for a 
bundle and ii) Duration of time for which those copies have been present in the network. 
The three settings are: i) full information, ii) partial information, and iii) no information. A 
source when forwarding a bundle to a relay along with a promise of the incentive, it gives 
the relay either full, partial or no information. The full information implies that the source 
tells the relay the number of copies that it has distributed before and also the time for which 
those copies have been in the network. The partial information signifies that the source 
only gives out the information about the number of copies. The no information setting 
means that the source does not give any information about the copies in circulation.  A 
relay therefore can decide if the incentive being promised to it is fair or not in terms of 
whether it will be able to deliver the message first. The reason behind this is that in this 
scheme, a relay to forward a message to a destination only receives the promised incentive 
from the destination if it is a first deliverer to that destination. The relay however can 
deliver the copies of the messages to multiple destinations and receive the incentive 
promise. 
In [6], MuRIS, an incentive driven information sharing in DTNs is proposed. It 
dynamically constructs efficient multicast delivery paths for multiple destinations 
interested in the same data item. An incentive mechanism motivates the uncooperative 
nodes so that they collect rewards associated with their forwarding efforts. There are two 
phases in MuRIS, viz., Information collection stage and Data Forwarding stage. In the 
warmup stage of Information collection, nodes use probe/receipt messages to learn about 
paths from publishers to various subscribers in the network. In addition to this, when two 
nodes encounter, they exchange the path information that is gathered by them and 
subsequently update their paths. Based on this, each nodes constructs a feasible path set. A 




stage, nodes exchange the data items of interests to each other. For the data items that could 
be forwarded by the other node, a node quantifies the reward for forwarding based on the 
feasible path set and the closeness vector. A data item is forwarded to the other node only 
if the path via the other node has a promise of providing the highest expected reward. 
In [7], the authors have proposed a Tit-For-Tat scheme which is an incentive-aware 
routing in DTNs. The main goal of TFT is to maximize the delivered traffic within a certain 
time frame. Their routing protocol consists of the following three components: (i) Link 
State Dissemination module in which every node periodically exchanges link state, (ii) 
Route computation module in which each source computes the forwarding paths based on 
link state and uses source routing to send its traffic, (iii) Acknowledgement dissemination 
module upon receiving data, each destination sends ACK via flooding and the source uses 
it to update its TFT constraints for the next interval. It is built on source routing because 
source routing can be used to optimize customized parameters for a source. The main 
assumption in this paper is that the link state is disseminated faithfully. They focus to make 
the data-plane incentive compatible. Acknowledgements can provide useful feedback 
required by TFT. Specifically, every node receiving the ACK first verifies the integrity of 
the attached source route and then checks if its identifier is present in the relay list. If it is, 
then the node increments its local TFT counters to indicate that the next node in the list 
successfully relayed a packet for it. Credit is only given to relay nodes on the forwarding 
path. 
2.2. REPUTATION BASED RELAY COORDINATION  
Reputation based coordination schemes are the ones in which nodes make use of 
the reputation values of the encountered nodes to determine whether to transfer a bundle 
to those nodes. In distributed reputation models, nodes take decisions by themselves after 
gathering information from previously encountered nodes, without intervention or 
assistance from a centralized entity. There are various ways to determine malicious nodes. 
The rule of thumb is the lower the reputation of a node, the more malicious that node is. 
Some of the related approaches of distributed reputation metric in delay tolerant networks 




REPSYS[8] is a recently proposed robust and distributed system for delay-tolerant 
networks. It utilizes a modified Bayesian approach to identify malicious nodes.  A 
reputation rating Rij between two nodes i and j is managed by the reputation module. It is 
updated when either the first-hand information is updated or the second-hand information 
is found to be valid. REPSYS is robust against false ratings and it is also efficient at 
detecting nodes’ misbehavior. REPSYS is robust because despite taking into account all 
the available information, it is resilient against false accusations and praise. It is also 
distributed because the decision to interact with another node is made entirely by each 
node. Bayesian decision theory is used to classify the nodes after taking into consideration 
all the available information. It is based on a Bayesian approach that uses the Beta 
distribution, and can be integrated with any DTN routing protocol. There are three modules 
in REPSYS: reputation module (reputation collection module, reputation evaluation 
module), trust module and routing decision module (that uses Bayesian classification). 
In [9], the authors have proposed a trust-based framework for data forwarding in 
opportunistic networks. They incorporate idea of a watchdog component at a node which 
is responsible for monitoring the behavior of other nodes. Whenever a node, say X, 
forwards a message to node Y which in turn forwards the message to node Z, node X looks 
out for Positive feedback messages(PFM) from the destinations(Z in this case). The 
watchdog component maintains two counters to determine the forwarding behavior of other 
nodes. Each node (e.g., node X) which sends out data to its next-hop forwarders, will keep 
recording for each of those forwarders how many PFMs corresponding to data sent out 
have and have not come back by using two counters, respectively.  A next-hop forwarder 
is suspicious if no PFMs are received for that forwarder. Therefore, there is no evidence of 
good forwarding behavior of that node. The no reception of PFMs due to the intermittent 
connectivity nature of opportunistic networks is also taken into account with Beta 
probability distribution function. 
In [10], an iterative algorithm for trust management and adversary detection is 
proposed. Service Providers(SP) are defined as nodes that participate in data forwarding 
whereas raters(R) are the ones that rate the data forwarders. The idea is based on Low 
Density Parity Code Check (LDPC). A bipartite graph is drawn consisting of SPs and Rs 




(ITRM) is executed at fixed time intervals. In the first iteration of the algorithm execution, 
the weight of the edge between an R and an SP is the rating that R has for that SP. A fading 
parameter w is defined. In the iterations henceforth, when a new rating between ith rater 
and jth SP arrives, the weight of the edge is recalculated as an average of the new rating 
and the old rating multiplied with the fading parameter. The decision of whether a node is 
good or bad is taken by a Beta probability distribution function. The problem of 
whitewashing, i.e., nodes with low ratings cancelling their account and then signing in 
again with a new ID in order to get a good rating, is also handled. 
Another cooperative watchdog system(CWS) to detect and avoid selfish nodes in 
the network in Vehicular Delay Tolerant Networks is proposed for in [11]. In this system, 
a node assigns a reputation value to each other node. Each time nodes get a contact 
opportunity, the CWS updated the reputation score via three modules, viz., classification, 
neighbors’ evaluation and decision modules. Nodes are classified into different types based 
on their reputation scores and the classification module calculates each node’s cooperative 
value. The cooperative value is then used by the decision module to determine whether to 
punish or reward the encountered node. Neighbors’ evaluation module determines how 
neighbors evaluate a node’s reputation on the network. Neighbors opinions are inquired 
and based on that, the reputation values are assigned. At the end of a contact opportunity, 
the decision module updates the rating for the encountered node based on the input from 
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ABSTRACT 
In Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs), to ensure successful message delivery, 
contribution of mobile nodes in relaying in an opportunistic fashion using social interests 
is essential. In our proposed data-centric dissemination protocol here, messages (images) 
are annotated with keywords by the source, and then intermediate nodes are presented with 
an option of adding keyword-based annotations to create higher content strength messages 
en-route toward the destination. Therefore, contents like images get enriched as the 
situation evolves or learned by these intermediate nodes, such as in a disaster situation, or 
in a battlefield. Due to limited battery and storage capacity in mobile devices, nodes might 
turn selfish and not participate in relaying messages. Thus, additionally, an incentive 
mechanism is proposed in this paper which considers factors like message quality, level of 
interests, battery usage, etc for the calculation of incentives. Moreover, in order to prevent 
the nodes from turning malicious by adding inappropriate message tags in pursuit of 
acquiring more incentive, a distributed reputation model (DRM) is developed and 
integrated with the proposed incentive scheme. DRM takes into account inputs from 
multiple users like ratings for the message quality, relevance of annotations in the message, 




selfish nodes in the system. The performance evaluation shows that our approach delivers 
more high priority and quality messages with reduced traffic with a slightly lower message 
delivery ratio compared to ChitChat, where a source forwards a message to intermediate 
nodes, which meet or exceed the matching strength of keyword-based interests. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Delay tolerant networking (DTN) is a networking paradigm characterized   by 
frequent disconnections between   nodes in   the   network   hence   resulting   into   lack   
of   end-to-end connectivity[1]. Message delivery in this scenario is achieved by utilizing 
the resources of multiple nodes which act as relays in the network.  These  nodes  relay  
content  in  order  for  the final  destination  to  receive  it.  DTN was initially proposed for 
inter-planetary networks and disaster relief team networks. Recently, it has  also  been  
applied  to  environments  such  as social networks and vehicular networks, and more 
recently in defense applications. A key challenge in DTNs is achievement of high message 
delivery ratios with finite lifetimes [2][3][4].  
In traditional DTNs, nodes are assumed to help other nodes for packet forwarding.  
But  in  a  real  scenario  of  DTN  deployment, the relay nodes could abstain from 
cooperation due to  a  limited  storage  capacity  and  battery  lifetime.  As  mobile nodes 
are managed by autonomous parties, the assumption that all  the  nodes  are  cooperative  
is  unrealistic,  and  at  the  same time, in defense applications, though the cooperation is 
not an issue,  but  controlling  the  congestion  is  important.  Therefore, incentive schemes 
[7] have been proposed to foster cooperation among participants, and control the 
congestion in DTN, which help in relaying messages.  
One  of  the  important  aspects  ignored  by  DTN  routing associated  with  incentive  
schemes  is  that  messages  are  taken and  delivered  as  black  box  by  relays,  but  do  
not  use  the knowledge of the relaying users in making the content richer by  adding  
semantics  in  terms  of  annotations.  Consider an application like military, where in-transit 




through DTNs. This can provide much better situational awareness in other applications 
also such as disaster response and recovery where situation evolves as time progresses.  
Another  issue  usually  ignored  in  DTNs  is  the  absence  of feedback  messages,  
thereby  incurring  large  delays.  In  fact, the  exchange  of  rewards  between  relays  
should  not  require feedback  messages.  In  order  to  overcome  the  lack  of  feed-backs, 
the proposed mechanism assumes that a relay receives a  positive  reward  if  and  only  if  
it  is  the  first  one  to  deliver the  message  to  the  corresponding  destination.  In  a  
similar fashion,  [6]  proposed  a  two  hop  incentive  scheme  in  which the  source  
promises  incentives  to  each  and  every  relay  but informs them that only the first one 
who deliver the message to the destination, receives the incentive.  
In this paper, we present a novel incentive mechanism taking into consideration 
reputation of nodes as well as addition of tags in enabling content-centric sharing of data 
such as images in DTNs. The parameters considered for incentive calculations are 
categorized  as  software  and  hardware  factors.  Software parameters are message size, 
message quality, interest levels of connected devices in the message, rank of the users 
possessing the connected mobile devices and priority of messages. Hard- ware factor taken 
into consideration is the energy consumption of a device delivering the message to the 
destination.  
One key challenge in developing any incentive mechanism is  the  presence  of  
malicious  nodes  which  try  to  game  the system by generating or relaying seemingly 
relevant message to  the  destination  at  an  abstract  level  while  also  helping themselves  
in  attainment  of  higher  incentives.  For example, consider a message consisting of an 
image of only a ”garden”. A source might annotate this message with a keyword “parking 
lot” but  there  is  no  parking  lot  in  the  image.  In  this  case, since  the  incentive  
mechanism  is  developed  based  on  the message annotations, a destination with an interest 
represented by ”parking lot” pays for false annotations on reception of the message. This 
problem is tackled by introducing a distributed reputation metric (DRM).  
Most of the existing works on distributed reputation metric depends on the 
existence of a centralized entity for reputation management.  Even  if  it  is  distributed  like  
recent  work  in [25],  only  the  behavior  of  the  nodes  in  terms  of  routing  is evaluated. 




where nodes may modify the contents maliciously. We also took into consideration 
different factors for the DTN scenario and developed a novel distributed reputation metric 
(DRM). The proposed DRM requires human judgement and input on each message content 
and each device owner can give a rating for message content quality and truthfulness of 
message annotations.  
To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  no  incentive  mechanism is  designed  for  data  
dissemination  in  DTN  which  considers content  enrichment  of  the  message  (images)  
as  others  are routing-centric. Our proposed scheme works on top of our state of the art 
routing called ChitChat routing [5] for data-centric message delivery in DTNs. We selected 
ChitChat as it achieves better  message  delivery  ratios  with  other  competitive  DTN 
routing  algorithms,  by  introducing  the  concept  of  transient social  relationships  (TSRs). 
Thus,  our  current  scheme  further  improves  data  dissemination  throughput  within 
ChitChat integrated  with  the  content-based  incentives  and  reputation schemes.  Note 
that our  proposed  scheme  can  be  integrated with any other DTN routing scheme. 
In summary, the following contributions are made here: 
• We  propose  content-based  data  dissemination  by  proposing  the  modification  
to  the  routing  phase  of  the  ChitChat algorithm  by  incorporating  incentives  associated  
with  the relaying as well as for making in-transit contents enriched by asking intermediate 
nodes to add meaningful annotations (to earn incentives) to improve the throughput and 
data quality with respect to the content delivery. 
• Incorporating  distributed  reputation  mechanism  of  users  in DTNs,  where  
incentives  earned  are  linked  with  reputations of users as well as quality of data. 
•The performance evaluation of our credit  and  reputation based scheme is 
performed using ONE [23] simulator. 
2. RELATED WORK AND BACKGROUND 
2.1. RELATED WORK 
In literature on DTNs [8][9] , several incentive schemes have been recently 




and cryptographic techniques are integrated to counteract the edge insertion and edge 
hiding attacks among nodes. SMART[13] is a secure multilayer credit-based incentive 
scheme for DTNs. In SMART, layered coins are provided as incentives to selfish DTN 
nodes for bundle forwarding. In [10], Tit-for-Tat (TFT) is used to design an incentive-
aware routing protocol in which selfish DTN nodes are allowed to maximize their 
individual utilities in conformity with TFT constraints. In [18], authors proposed an 
incentive driven dissemination scheme in which nodes are encouraged to cooperate while 
choosing delivery paths that can reach maximum number of nodes possible with fewest 
transmissions. PI [12] attaches an incentive on the sending bundle to stimulate the selfish 
nodes to cooperate in message delivery. MobiGame [14] is an incentive scheme for DTNs 
based on user centricity and socially aware reputation. [15] proposes socially selfish 
routing in DTNs, where a node considers social willingness to determine whether or not 
packets should be relayed to the nodes in the vicinity. Authors in [16] formulate nodal 
communication as a two-person cooperative game for a credit-based incentive scheme to 
promote nodal collaboration. RELICS [17] is a energy-aware cooperation based incentive 
mechanism for selfish DTNs, in which a rank metric is designed to quantify the transit 
behavior of a node. [19] is a credit-based incentive system using the theory of Minority 
Games [20] in order to attain coordination in distributed fashion. This mechanism considers 
the realistic case when the cost for taking part in the forwarding process varies with the 
devices technology or the users habits.  
In [21], detection of faulty sensors in a DTN node of a wireless sensor network is 
performed by using outlier detection algorithm. DISARM [22], another distributed 
reputation model, takes into account social relations amongst agents in a multi-agent 
environment. In DISARM, the agents draw reasonable conclusions from incomplete and 
possibly conflicting information based on factors like correctness, transaction value and so 
on. A Robust and Distributed Reputation System for Delay-Tolerant Networks [25] has 
been proposed which considers interaction with nodes, feedback messages and false 
ratings. [26] uses trust-based framework to more accurately evaluate an encounter's 
delivery competency. A graph based iterative algorithm motivated by the prior success of 
message passing techniques for decoding low-density parity-check codes over bipartite 




in [28] in which nodes exchange reputation of previously encountered nodes in the network 
in order to detect misbehaved nodes. 
2.2. BACKGROUND 
This section provides overview of the underlying routing algorithm, ChitChat, used 
in our work. 
In ChitChat, nodes are users with small pocket devices that are equipped with 
ChitChat system, which automatically connect to other devices that are within the 
communication range. Each user has their own social profile, i.e., a group of interests 
specified by semantic keywords. Messages are also annotated with appropriate metadata 
keywords. When two nodes connect with each other, they chitchat to exchange the 
following two kinds of information: (i) direct social interests, which is the metadata, or the 
set of keywords, that describe the encountered node’s interests, roles, and responsibilities 
(e.g. social interests such as “photography” and “gourmet cooking”, or role-specific 
metadata such as “MANET researcher”, “military intelligence officer”); and (ii) transient 
social relationships, which is aggregated information of the social interests of the people 
that the node has encountered before. This approach allows the social interests to be 
dynamically expanded, refined and aggregated in real-time into the richer transient social 
relationships so as to capture multi-hop relationships. A destination for a message is 
defined as a device with direct interest in keywords of the message  whereas a relay is 
defined as one with acquired interests. 
ChitChat system consists of two major components with associated storage buffers: 
(i) Realtime Transient Social Relationship (RTSR) modeling, and (ii) Message Routing. 
The overall data flow in the ChitChat equipped network is as follows: When two users 
come within communication range, the ChitChat system first invokes the RTSR module. 
The RTSR module will automatically exchange the two users’ current Transient Social 
Relationships (TSRs), resulting in an adjustment in their TSRs based on a growth-decay 
model. Then, the ChitChat invokes the message routing to exchange a selected subset of 
messages carried by the two users based on the analysis results of their revised TSRs. 




2.3. RTSR MODULE 
The Real-time Transient Social Relationship modeling aims to represent the 
evolution of each user’s social interests impacted by the people that they encounter. The 
flow for RTSR after two ChitChat equipped devices have established connection is: i) 
decay algorithm ii) exchange of decayed weights iii) growth algorithm. Initially when the 
interest represented by a keyword is defined for the first time by a user, it's weight is set to 
0.5. Maximum allowed value for the weight is 1. 
Given below are the decay and growth algorithms: 
• Decay Algorithm 
Given interest I for a user, the weight for I is decayed based on whether a device 
with shared interest I is currently connected to this user’s device or not.  
The variables in the following algorithm (Algorithm 1) are:  
𝛽-decay constant, 𝑇𝑐 - current time,Tl - Latest timestamp at which a device with 
interest I was connected, Wn- new weight, Wp- previous weight   
Algorithm 1: Decay algorithm execution in device u   
procedure DECAY(u)  
for all I in device u  
If a device with I is connected:  
𝑊𝑛 = 𝑊𝑝  
If a device with interest I is not connected:   
If I is a direct interest, then  
𝑊𝑛 = (𝑊𝑝 − 0.5)/(𝛽 ∗ (𝑇𝑐 − 𝑇𝑙)) + 0.5   
Else  
𝑊𝑛 = (𝑊𝑝)/(𝛽 ∗ (𝑇𝑐 − 𝑇𝑙))  
end for  
end procedure  
Example execution: If device 1 is connected to device 2 and both have interest in 




connected device with a shared interest “food coupon" about 5 seconds ago and which is 
no longer connected, then new weights are calculated by the formula 𝑊𝑛 = (𝑊𝑝 −
0.5)/(𝛽 ∗ (𝑇𝑐 − 𝑇𝑙)) + 0.5, 𝑊𝑛 = (0.6 − 0.5)/(2 ∗ 5) + 0.5 = 0.55.   
• Growth Algorithm 
After decay phase, the updated weights are exchanged. In the following algorithm 
(Algorithm 2), the symbols are: 𝜓 is an integer value out of a set of {1,6} corresponding 
to different cases. E.g., if both u and v have I as a direct interest, value of 𝜓 is 1. If u has a 
direct interest and v has a transient interest, value of 𝜓 is 2. 𝑤𝑛 is the newweight of an 
interest I in the node u whereas 𝑤𝑝 is the old weight. 𝑤𝑣(𝐼) is the weight of interest I in v. 
𝑇𝑣 is the time at which v established connection. Δ is the change in weight.   
Algorithm 2: Growth algorithm execution in device u  
procedure GROWTH(u) 
for all interests I in device u  
Δ = 0  
for all currently connected devices v  
Δ+= (𝑤𝑣(𝐼) ∗ (𝑇𝑐 − 𝑇𝑣))/𝜓  
end for  
𝑤𝑛 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{1, 𝑤𝑝 + Δ}   
end for   
end procedure  
2.4. MESSAGE ROUTING MODULE 
The message routing module selects better message forwarders based on their 
Transient Social Relationships. Moreover, each relay has a message buffer with a fixed 
size. After this execution is done, messages are routed according to the sum of weights of 
social interests in the sending device and receiving device. If the sum of weights of interests 
for a message in sending device is less than that in receiving device, then that message is 




sending device, v is the receiving device, and 𝑆𝑢 and 𝑆𝑣 are the sum of weights for interests 
in message M in devices u and v.  
3. DTN ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW 
In Figure 3.1, the overall architecture of the developed system is shown. The 
devices owned by Alice and Bob are deployed with the implementation of the proposed 
system. After establishing connection, the RTSR+DR module shares annotations and 
encountered devices’ reputations. The message router module in Alice then selects the 
messages for which Bob can be destination or relay by incorporating mechanism. The same  
 
    Figure 3.1. Data Flow between Two Connected Nodes 
module is run by Bob. Following this, Alice and Bob have option of adding more text 
annotations to the received messages in message buffer by running content enrichment 
module. Additionally, they can run the module of proposed Distributed Reputation 




Incentive Mechanism, Distributed Reputation Model and Content Enrichment through 
annotations. The three subsections included in this section discusses message format, 
incentive mechanism and distributed reputation model.  
3.1. MESSAGE FORMAT 
The multimedia message format is shown in Figure 3.2 where (i) topic implies 
interests (ii) location parameters such as latitude and longitude are stored as key-value 
 
                                  
 Figure 3.2.  Message Format 
attributes. A message in the system is an encapsulation of the multimedia data along with 
some metadata tags. Additionally, a UUID which is a unique identifier for the message 
makes sure that the message does not get duplicated in any device. A timestamp, the time 
at which the multimedia content for the message created is also added as a part of the 
message. Source and destinations, MIME and format of the message are also added. 
3.2. INCENTIVE MECHANISM 
The proposed incentive mechanism is credit and reputation based. This subsection 




that can be used to perform the message dissemination as well as for making the content 
enriched. The factors considered for incentive determination are categorized as software 
and hardware. The software parameters are specific to user and content quality, whereas 
hardware parameters comprise of energy consumption in providing the service.  
In our model, a source or a relay forwards a message to another relay node along 
with a promise of certain number of incentive tokens from a destination upon successful 
delivery of the message. In the case where there are more than one hops from a source to 
destination, a relay follows the exact same process that a source follows. Additionally, if a 
relay A transfers a message to a relay B, A receives a fraction of incentive from B if B has 
a very high chance of delivering the message. For example, for a message M tagged with 
a set of interests/keywords I{i1,i2,...in} having corresponding set of weights 
W{w1,w2,..,wn} to be forwarded from relay A to relay B, an average of weights 𝐴𝑤 are 
computed for message for the remote node B. If 𝐴𝑤 is greater than a certain very high pre-
defined value, B offers a percentage of incentive token values to A.  
                      Table 3.1. Symbol Descriptors 
𝐼𝑠  Promised incentive value due to software factors  
𝐼ℎ  Promised incentive value due to hardware factors   
𝑃𝑣  Priority level of message M to node v   
𝑅𝑢  Role of the sending user  
𝐼𝑚  Maximum incentive possible   
S  Size of the message  
𝑆𝑚  Maximum size of messages in u   
𝑄  Quality of the message   
𝑄𝑚  Maximum quality of a message from a set of 
messages in u   
𝑃𝑠  Priority of a message set by source of the message(1-
3 for high, medium, low)   





Table 3.1. Symbol Descriptors(Contd.) 
𝑤𝑚  Maximum out of sum of weights of interests as 
known by u corresponding to all connected devices 
for a message   
𝑃𝑟  Reception power for a device  
𝑃𝑡  Transmission power for a device   
𝐿𝑣  Path loss   
𝐼𝑡  Incentive reward to a relay due to all added tags  
𝐼𝑡𝑘  Incentive reward to a relay due to an added tag k  
𝑅𝑖  Rating of the message i   
𝑅𝑡  Input Rating for the tags of a received message   
𝐶  Confidence of a user in the input rating of tags   
𝐶𝑚  Maximum possible value of confidence   
𝑅𝑞  Rating for quality of message   
𝛼  Weight of self-calculate rating   
𝑟𝑣,𝑢  Rating of device v in device u  
𝑚𝑣  Message received from v   
𝑟𝑚𝑣   Rating of message 𝑚𝑣  
𝑟𝑚𝑣,𝑥  Rating of message 𝑚𝑣 corresponding to node x and as 
known by node v  
𝑟𝑚  Maximum device rating  
𝐼𝑣  Incentive awarded to node v for a message 𝑚𝑣   
A destination can also reward an intermediate node if that node added additional 
relevant message annotations to in-transit messages. The motivation behind relays 
enriching content is, therefore, attainment of higher incentive. Finally, if a device exhausts 
all of its tokens, it is no longer allowed to receive messages that it itself is interested in. 
This results in reduced network congestion. Calculation of incentive promise is explained 





• Software factors  
The user-centric factors considered here are priority level of message defined by 
source, role of a user, priority level of message to the destination. The data-centric factors 
considered are size and quality of the message. The table above shows the parameters used 
in our algorithms.  
Users might have different roles (R) based upon the scenario of DTN deployment. 
For example, in a battlefield deployment, users can be Sergeant, Soldier, etc. The user on 
top of hierarchy has a role 1. In this example, 1 corresponds to a user who is a Sergeant. If 
Soldier is the next role in the hierarchy, this category corresponds to 2, and so on. Priority 
level of a message M that is possessed by a user u that intends to forward it to user v(𝑃𝑣) is 
defined as a ratio of i) sum of weights of interestsfor message M in v as known by u(∑𝑤) 
to ii) maximum sum of weights of interests for the message amongst all the devices 
connected to u(𝑤𝑚). 𝑃𝑣 ensures that maximum incentive promise is provided to a node 
which belongs to a set of currently connected nodes and has the highest delivery 
probability. When two nodes connect and are in routing phase of ChitChat, a set of 
algorithms are executed, first of which is the following:   
Algorithm 3: Calculate incentive promised from user u to user v due 
to software factors   
procedure calculateIncentive(u,v)  
if 𝑃𝑣=0 and 𝑅𝑢 < 𝑅𝑣 and 𝑃𝑠 = 1(high)   
𝐼𝑠 = 𝐼𝑚  
else If 𝑃𝑣 <> 0,  
do 𝑃𝑣 = (∑𝑤)/(𝑤𝑚)   
𝐼𝑠 = (1/4 ∗ (𝑆/𝑆𝑚 + 𝑄/𝑄𝑚) + ½ ∗ (𝑃𝑣/(𝑅𝑢 ∗ 𝑃𝑢))) ∗ 𝐼𝑚   
end if   
end procedure   
To explain the above algorithm, consider a scenario of battlefield with user roles as 
ßoldier" represented by 2 and ßergeant" represented by 1. Device u belongs to a sergeant 




at the current moment, it might still acquire the TSRs corresponding to the message, 
resulting in non-zero probability of v’s ability to deliver the message. Device v is promised 
maximum possible incentive. Instead, if v can deliver the message, factors such as size of 
the message, quality of message and others are taken into account and incentive is a factor 
of maximum incentive possible. Greater the size of the message, greater the incentive 
promise to v as a long message reduces the buffer size by a higher factor compared to 
smaller message. To ensure that the messages generated in the system are of higher quality, 
high quality promises higher incentive. In the formula given above in else case, user-centric 
and data-centric factors each have 50 percent weight in deciding the incentive promised.  
• Hardware factors 
The hardware parameter taken into consideration is the power consumption in 
transmission of a message. If a source directly delivers a message to the destination, the 
incentive tokens corresponding to the amount of power consumed in transmitting that 
message is awarded to the source by the destination. If a relay instead delivers the message 
to the destination, it receives incentive tokens proportional to the amount of power 
consumed in receiving the message as well as forwarding of the message. 𝐼ℎ represents the 
incentive tokens’ promise corresponding to hardware factor.  
As battery conservation is significant issue in mobile devices, source and relay must 
be rewarded proportionally for the energy consumption in relaying. Friis equation [29] is 
used for calculating power consumption on receiver side. Incentive promise is defined as 
a function of power consumption. The parameters involved in Friis equation are i) 
transmission power, ii) receiving power, iii) distance between the connection devices, iv) 
Bandwidth. The receiving power can be calculated using Friis equation as follows:  
𝑃𝑟 = 𝑃𝑡/𝐿𝑣 
where  
𝐿𝑣 = (4 ∗ 𝜋 ∗ 𝑅/𝜆)
2 
R=distance between two devices and 𝜆=bandwidth  
When a source directly delivers a message to the destination, the incentive 
proportional to the battery consumption is only a function of transmission power and 
elapsed time.  




where c is a constant, 𝑃𝑡 is the transmission power of the source and t is time elapsed in 
delivering the message.   
When a relay delivers a message to the destination, the data dissemination 
consumes battery in the relay in the reception of the message from another relay or source 
as well as in the transmission of this message to the destination. So the relay should 
becompensated for both of these actions. In this case, incentive tokens’ value is defined as 
follows:  
𝐼ℎ = 𝑐 ∗ (𝑃𝑡 + 𝑃𝑟) ∗ 𝑡 
where c is a proportionality constant, 𝑃𝑡 is the transmission power used by relay in 
forwarding the message to the destination and 𝑃𝑟 is the power consumed in receiving the 
message from another source or relay. So, the total incentive promise to a relay is the sum 
of the incentive due to the software and hardware factors:  
𝐼 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝐼𝑠 + 𝐼ℎ, 𝐼𝑚} 
In addition to the incentive tokens provided by above formula, relay nodes are 
compensated for additional annotations applied to the in-transit messages. The relay node 
delivering the message with the added relevant annotations to a destination collects this 
additional incentive from the destination. If a relay adds n additional keywords and only x 
are relevant for a destination, the destination will only compensate for x tags. Given the set 
of relevant added tags T{𝑡1, 𝑡2. . 𝑡𝑥}. The incentive 𝐼𝑡 rewarded for added tags is:  
𝐼𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{∑𝐼𝑡𝑘 , 𝐼𝑐} 
𝐼𝑐 is a cap on incentive tokens for additional tags. 𝐼𝑡𝑘 is the incentive due to one 
added tag defined as follows:  
𝐼𝑡𝑘 = 𝑧 ∗ 𝐼𝑚 
where 𝐼𝑚 is the maximum incentive defined earlier and z is a constant such that 
0 < 𝑧 < 1 . 
3.3. DISTRIBUTED REPUTATION MODEL 
The main motivation behind the development of this model is to reduce the number 




more incentive tokens. For example, it might happen that a message containing an image 
is tagged with keywords "red car" but there is no "red car" in the image. In such a case, a 
destination will end up paying for the irrelevant tags as well, thus wasting it’s incentive 
tokens for sharing. To counteract this problem, we propose the following solution. Nodes 
can assign a rating to messages that they acquire. A recipient node can rate the source and 
other intermediate nodes(if any) of a message. The source is rated for the message quality 
and the added tags whereas an intermediate node is rated for any of the added tags in the 
process of content enrichment. These nodes subsequently calculate the device ratings for 
the source and relays. Rating of a node is calculated as an average of ratings of the messages 
received from that node. They share this rating with the next hop in the path of message 
traversal to a destination. When a message eventually reaches the destination, the 
delivering device also sends the destination the ratings for the message from all the hops 
in the path that might have assigned a rating to the message. The destination utilizes these 
ratings and any previously acquired knowledge about the reputation of the delivering node 
to decide the number of incentive tokens to be awarded to the delivering node. The 
reputation of the deliverer is taken into account in order to avoid highly penalizing a good 
deliverer.  
• Rating of a message 
When a user receives a message, the user can assign the message rating for the 
nodes in the path of the message. Source of the message is rated based on the amount of 
relevant annotations as well as quality of the message as input by the recipient. A relay in 
the path is rated for the additional annotations that it might have added to the message. A 
user might not have a total confidence in the rating he/she inputs for the annotations. For 
example, if an image of a person named "Adam" is annotated with the keyword "Adam" 
but the user has a conjecture that the image is in fact of a person named "Bill". The user is 
not entirely certain. In this case, the user can add a confidence value on the ratings of tags. 
The rating of a source node is calculated as:  
𝑅𝑖 = 1/2 ∗ (𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐶/𝐶𝑚) + 1/2 ∗ 𝑅𝑞 
The rating of an intermediate node in the path is calculated as:  
𝑅𝑖 = (𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐶/𝐶𝑚) 




1. Rating of a node and incentive award 
Rating of a node is computed in two cases: 1) When a node in the path of a message 
assigns a rating to nodes in the path before it, and 2) When say node 1 receives rating of 
node 2 from node 3. These cases are handled in the following manner:  
Case 1: When a node u assigns a rating corresponding to a message M to a node v 
in the path of M, u calculates the rating of v as an average of ratings of messages received 
from device v.  
𝑟𝑣,𝑢 =∑𝑟𝑚𝑣 /𝑁 
where N is the total number of message received from node v. 
 Case 2: When node u receives a rating of node v from node z, u performs the 
calculation for rating of node v as follows:  
𝑟𝑣,𝑢 = (1 − 𝛼) ∗ 𝑟𝑣,𝑧 + 𝛼 ∗ 𝑟𝑣,𝑢 
Consider a destination node u receiving a message 𝑚𝑣 from node v. v also transmits 
the ratings assigned to all the nodes X corresponding to 𝑚𝑣. Then, the incentive awarded 
to node v by node u is as follows:  
𝐼𝑣 = ((1 − 𝛼) ∗ (∑𝑟𝑚𝑣,𝑥)/𝑁 + 𝛼 ∗ 𝑟𝑣,𝑢/𝑟𝑚)) ∗ (𝐼 + 𝐼𝑡) 
where 𝛼 > 0.5, N is the number of hops in the path of the message 𝑚𝑣 from a source to 
the destination u  
Summing up everything, the overall data flow between two connected devices u 
and v is as follows: Devices u and v connect, and share their interests with each other. u 
generates two sets of messages, a set of messages for which v is a destination and another 
set of messages for which v is a relay. For the first set, u requests v the promised incentive 
tokens while also sharing the ratings of the nodes in the path of the message. Device v 
calculates 𝐼𝑎 and checks whether 𝐼𝑎 is less than the number of incentive tokens left on it. If 
it has that many tokens left, it awards the deliverer and the deliverer then delivers the 
message. The second set of messages from u to v for which u is a relay is further divided 
into two subsets. The first subset consists of messages for which v has a very high 
probability of meeting the destination whereas the second set consists of messages for 




percentage of promised incentive from v. If v has that many tokens left, they are awarded 
to u and the message is received. v receives the full incentive promised by delivering the 
message. u subsequently forwards the messages in the second subset free of cost to v along 
with the incentive promised.  
4. OPERATOR FUNCTIONS 
This section describes the user defined functions that the system must perform in 
conformance with the proposed approach. Some of these functions require human 
intervention. The format of the operator functions is given below:  
Function 1: Operator Function (Input(optional))   
Returns: Output   
User Task(Optional): Instructions the crowd needs to follow during operations.   
Task: Information regarding what operations (rank, verify, etc.) the crowd/worker 
has to perform over the event.   
As can be seen from above, user task and input are optional entities. For use of 
some of the functions defined below, a user defined class called Message is created. The 
format of this message is given earlier.  
1) Annotate 
This is the task a DTN user performs to annotate a file with the keywords that 
describe the file. We consider the example of an image file. When a user selects an image 
file from the file system of his/her device, the system can fetch semantics of keywords 
from a cloud if the online network connectivity is available. The user can modify some of 
the labels fetched, keeping the ones that suits the image. The user can also add custom 
labels of his/her own. For example, the cloud’s image processing platform might not be 
able to recognize face of a person in the image but the user knows who that person is. Thus, 
the user can add this name to the annotations of the image. Furthermore, all the keywords 
are assigned a weight of 0.5 initially when the annotations are saved. This initial weight is 




Function 2: Annotate(byte[] ImageFile)   
Returns: (String[] keywords)  
User Task: Modify the labels fetched if required, assign message priority and 
save the labels  
Task: Fetch and save labels for the image from cloud, save location and 
timestamp of the image  
2) Subscribe  
This function lets a user add keyword based interests that act as subscription 
keywords. Any connected device possessing a message annotated with these subscription 
keywords can share the messages with this user.  
Function 2: Subscribe(String[] interests)   
Returns: Void  
User Task: Add keywords to the set of interests  
Task: Save interests in the database  
3) DecayWeights  
This function corresponds to the ChitChat’s decay algorithm. Weights are decayed 
upon establishing connection with a device within communication range.  
Function 3: DecayWeights(String[] keywords, double[] weights)   
Returns: (double[] weights)  
Task: Decay weights according to phase one of ChitChat routing weights’ 
exchange algorithm  
4) IncrementWeights  
This function corresponds to the ChitChat’s growth algorithm which decays 
weights according to the growth model. The resulting output is an incremented weights for 





Function 4: IncrementWeights(String[] keywords,double[] weights)   
Returns: (double[] weights)  
Task: Increment weights according to phase two of ChitChat routing weights’ 
exchange algorithm   
5) GetMessagesToForward  
This function finds all the messages to be forwarded to a connected device with 
certain discovered IP address or MAC address, depending upon the mode of 
communication used, WiFi or Bluetooth.  
Function 5:GetMessagesToForward(String[] RemoteDeviceInterests,String 
DeviceAddress)   
Returns: (Message[] messages)  
Task: Iterate over the input interests array mapped with the device address and 
find the corresponding messages  
6) DeviceType   
After determining a set of messages to be forwarded to a connected device, it is 
important to decide if the connected device is a destination or a relay for every message. 
Hence, this function is executed for all the messages intended to be forwarded to 
aconnected device. A connected device is a relay if the subscription keywords of the device 
is transient, otherwise it is a destination.  
Function 6: DecideDestOrRelay(Message message,String MacAddress)   
Returns: (String role)  
Task: Determines if the connected node is a destination or a relay  
7) BestRelay 
Weight of an interest is a measure of encounter probability of the connected device 
with a destination. When a device u is connected to more than one device with common 
interests, this function decides the best relay to forward a message based on the weights of 




destination. The goal is to reduce the number of messages considerably without 
significantly affecting the message delivery ratio.  
Function 7: DecideBestRelay(String[] MacAddresses,Message message)   
Returns: (String MacAddress)  
Task: Return the best possible relay to forward the input message   
8) Incentivize  
When the message sharing module is executed, a source or relay forwarding the 
message to either a relay or destination executes this function. If a source forwards a 
message to a destination, the source computes the incentive tokens and requests them from 
the destination before forwarding the message. If a source or relay is forwarding the 
message to a relay, they can execute this function to determine the number of tokens that 
need to be given to the receiving relay.  
Function 8: ComputeIncentive(Message message,String MacAddress)   
Returns: (double incentiveToken)  
Task: Calculate the incentive tokens for this message  
9) RateMessage  
This function allows a user to rate a message according to DRM. The higher the 
ratings of the message, higher is the possibility of the average of messages received from 
the same source.  
Function 9: RateMessage(Message M)   
Returns: (double Rating)  
User Task: Add ratings for i) message quality, ii)keywords for  
the message and iii) give confidence value on ratings of keywords  






10) RateNode  
This function is used to calculate the rating of a device. This function belongs to 
DRM module. This is calculated by performing the aggregate function average on ratings 
of the message from the node. The input is device address of a source node in question.  
Function 10: RateNode(String MacAddress)   
Returns: (double Rating)  
Task: Calculate rating for device based on all messages from the device as a 
source 
11) Enrich  
This function is used by a relay to add further annotations to a message received 
from another device and to be relayed.  
Function 11: Enrich(Message message, String[] annotations) Returns: 
(String[] newAnnotations)  
Task: Save the added annotations from the user  
User task: Add additional relevant keywords to the message  
5. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
In this section, experimental settings are introduced first followed by the results. 
All the experiments were conducted in ONE simulator version 1.6.0. We compare the 
performance of our approach with the ChitChat routing algorithm upon which our work is 
built on, and show how the proposed algorithm improves the performance. The results 
shown are average of five simulation runs. Note that no other previous incentive scheme 
considers content enrichment and ranking in DTN, and ChitChat beats other recent 
competitive DTN social-based routing algorithms, therefore, we improve ChitChat 
algorithm and our scheme can be integrated with any other DTN routing. The following 





                                      Table 5.1. Simulation Parameters 
Configuration                                 Default Values   
Number of Participants  500  
Pool of Social Interest Keywords  200  
No of Defined Social Interests  20 per node   
Transmission speed  250 kBps   
Transmission radius  100 meters   
Buffer capacity  250 MB   
Message Size  1 MB   
Area  5 sq.km.   
Simulated time  24 hours   
Threshold for relay  0.8   
Number of initial tokens  200 per node  
In the table above, threshold for relay is explained with an imaginary scenario 
mentioned subsequently. Consider a scenario in which relay 1 encounters relay 2 and a 
connection is established between these nodes. Relay 1 possesses a message M for relay 
2.M is tagged with a set of keywords T. If the average of weights of tags in T for relay 2 
as known by relay 1 upon initial exchange of keywords is greater than the relay threshold, 
relay 2 pays for a fraction of incentive being promised to it by relay 1 for M. To calculate 
the performance of our approach, the experiments were conducted to find the effect of 
fluctuation of selfish nodes’ percentage on message delivery ratio and traffic. Variation of 
percentage of malicious nodes and it’s effect on MDR is also checked. Note that all the 
experiments are conducted under Random Waypoint mobility model. Following 




A. Effect of Selfish Users on Message Delivery Ratio 
This is the result shown in Figure 5.1. In this experiment, the number of selfish 
nodes kept is 500. We vary the percentage of selfish nodes at a rate of 10% from 0 to 100 
    
Figure 5.1. MDR vs Percentage of Selfish Nodes 
percent. The message delivery ratio in our approach is slightly lesser than ChitChat. The 
reason behind this is the exhausted incentive tokens in nodes while performing the message 
disseminations. There is inverse proportionality between the message delivery ratio and 
percentage of selfish nodes. The primary reason behind this is that as the number of selfish 
nodes rises, there will be lesser message dissemination because the selfish node randomly 
participates in forwarding messages. For this experiment, the selfish nodes forward a 
message to another encountered node in the network one out of ten times. This is simulated 
by switching off the communication medium in the selfish nodes. A selfish node has its 
communication medium open one out of ten times when it encounters another node in the 
network. This is also the reason why the delivery ratio does not drop to absolute zero even 
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B. Reduced Traffic compared to ChitChat 
This experiment is to find out what percentage of traffic is reduced over ChitChat 
while there is a reduction in the delivery ratio. The result for this experiment is shown in 
Figure 5.2 where all the parameters are kept exactly the same as the first experiment. As it 
can be seen, the higher is the selfish nodes %, more the traffic is reduced. This result makes 
sense because as the percentage of selfish nodes rises, the incentive tokens assigned to 
them initially to participate in message forwarding, are exhausted faster.  
 
             Figure 5.2. Percentage of Reduced Traffic over ChitChat 
C.  Effect of Tokens on the Message Delivery Ratio 
The initial tokens assigned to the nodes are the ones that they use for participation 
in message forwarding. The result of this experiment is shown in Figure 5.3.  
The plots show that for a higher selfish percentage, the message delivery ratio is 
lower. It also manifests that as the number of tokens assigned to the nodes increases, the 
message delivery ratio also increases. This is because of the fact that incentive tokens in 
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      Figure 5.3. Initial Tokens’ Variance 
D. Recognition of Malicious Nodes 
Malicious nodes are defined as the nodes which might either add irrelevant tags to 
the message or create low quality messages towards the goal of attaining higher incentive  
 





























AVERAGE RATING(AR) OF MALICIOUS NODES 
IN NON-MALICIOUS NODES VS TIME 
Malicious nodes- 10 percent Malicious nodes- 20 percent




tokens by propagating messages in the network. In Figure 5.4, we find the rate at which 
malicious nodes in the system are identified by non-malicious nodes. It is important to note 
that all the above experiments are performed with the content enrichment. However, in 
those experiments, the percentage of malicious nodes was kept to zero. Average rating of 
malicious nodes in the non-malicious nodes is a factor which can explain the overall 
capability of the developed Distributed Reputation Model. With this goal in sight, the 
malicious nodes percentage is varied from 10 to 40 at an interval of 10. The highest rating 
a node can assign to another node is 5 for the experiments. The time period of the 
simulation is 24 hours. It is found that with the evolution of time, the recognition of 
malicious nodes is accelerated. Moreover, as sthe number of malicious nodes increases, 
faster the malicious nodes are recognized. This is owing to the fact that more the number 
of malicious users in an area, more are the chances of a non-malicious node to encounter a 
malicious node. The encountered non-malicious node then shares the rating of this 
encountered malicious node with another encountered non-malicious node.  
E. Effect of Number of Users on Message Delivery Ratio 
This experiment was conducted in order to check how MDR is affected with a 
varying number of users in a fixed area of 5 sq. km. The result is shown in Figure 5.5. The  
 


















number of users is varied from 500 to 1500 with an interval of 500 users here. The plot 
shows that as the number of users increases, the Message Delivery Ratio for both ChitChat 
and Incentive increases. Another important observation here is that the difference between 
the MDR for ChitChat and Incentive mechanism decreases gradually with the incremented 
number of users and this difference almost fades away when the number of users are 1500. 
The reason behind this gradual decline of MDR difference is that the number of message 
carriers grows with the rise in the number of users.Therefore, a message might travel 
through multiple paths.  
F. Priority Segmented MDR 
In the first two experiments, a decrease in MDR was compensated by the reduced 
traffic overhead. However, it is important to analyze the quality of messages disseminated  
 
        Figure 5.6. Priority Segmented MDR vs Selfish Percent of Nodes 
by our scheme. Thus, we ran simulations where selfish percentage of nodes is kept at 20 
percent and 40 percent. The number of nodes is 500 in a 5 sq km area. Out of these nodes, 
50% of the nodes generated high quality larger size and high priority messages, 30% 


















that in both the cases, viz., 20% and 40% selfish nodes, higher number of high priority 
messages is delivered in our scheme compared to Chitchat. This is because our approach 
prioritizes messages based on the quality as well as the assigned priority. Moreover, the 
higher quality message has a larger size also, and thus, higher energy is consumed in 
propagating, and therefore, the incentive received for forwarding such messages is also 
higher. Therefore, nodes earn higher incentives making it an overall higher priority 
message dissemination scheme.  
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we present a novel content-centric data dissemination technique using 
a combination of credit as well as reputation based incentive mechanism designed, which 
is integrated with Chitchat routing [5]. Our proposed scheme successfully delivers higher 
quality and priority messages while motivating the selfish nodes to participate in content 
enrichment and message forwarding to earn incentives. Our scheme is also successful in 
identifying and barring the malicious nodes in the network from receiving messages. Our 
experiments show that message delivery ratio attained is almost the same as ChitChat while 
curbing the network congestion and malicious nodes even further. Moreover, the content 
enrichment makes the content richer as the message propagates deeper into the network. A 
demo application for our mechanism has also been developed and tested for Android 
environment for Bluetooth as a communication medium [24]. Stress testing in the real 
world environment will help in evaluating the performance and usability of our mechanism.  
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II. INCENTIVE MECHANISM FOR DATA-CENTRIC MESSAGE DELIVERY 
IN DELAY TOLERANT NETWORKS 
ABSTRACT 
A key issue in delay tolerant networks (DTN) is to find the right node to store and 
relay messages. We consider messages annotated with the unique keywords describing the 
message subject, and nodes also adds keywords to describe their mission interests, priority 
and their transient social relationship (TSR). To offset resource costs, an incentive 
mechanism is developed over transient social relationships which enrich en-route message 
content and motivate better semantically related nodes to carry and forward messages. The 
incentive mechanism ensures avoidance of congestion due to uncooperative or selfish 
behavior of nodes. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Delay Tolerant Networks (DTN) use store and forward paradigm for message 
dissemination in an environment that lacks continuous connectivity due to the presence of 
obstacles/inactive nodes or in absence of communication infrastructure support. In DTN, 
users can share messages based on their social interests. For a higher data delivery rate, we 
use message annotations in [2] for in-transit mission packets for data-centric intelligent 
routing decisions. A node passes messages to intermediate individuals, which match or 
exceed the strength of keyword-based annotations of the message. In addition, intermediate 
nodes add keywords-based annotations to create higher content strength messages and will 
direct messages toward the destination. In our work here, thus, content gets enriched as the 
situation evolves, such as in a disaster situation, traffic event/condition or in a battlefield. 
However, battery and memory are limited in mobile devices, therefore, even with the most 
efficient routing algorithms in place, some nodes turn uncooperative to conserve resources. 
In addition, some nodes may start generating a lot of messages which might lead to 




To counteract these challenges, an incentive mechanism [3] is developed on top of 
Chit-chat algorithm [1] for better message dissemination and to address selfish behavior. 
In this approach, incentives are provided to nodes for active participation of the high 
priority messages forwarding and for enriching the content of en-route messages. The 
objective of this demo paper is to demonstrate the developed DTN application to address 
the aforementioned problems.  
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Given a mobile device possessing a set of messages to be forwarded in DTN, the 
problem is to design an incentive mechanism on top of our existing ChitChat algorithm [1] 
for efficient message delivery. The incentive formulation must correctly consider the 
significant factors that encourage data-centric dissemination of messages. If an interested 
device does not have any incentive to allocate to a relay node, it should not receive the 
message for forwarding.  
3. ARCHITECTURE 
The incentive mechanism developed on top of an already existing ChitChat 
algorithm [1] achieves faster and higher message delivery ratio using nodes’ transient 
social interests for data delivery. A universal message format is used throughout the 
network for the sake of consistency. The following subsections illustrate message format, 
ChitChat algorithm and the incentive mechanism. 
3.1. MESSAGE FORMAT 
The multimedia message format is shown in Figure 3.1 where (i) topic implies 
interests (ii) location parameters such as latitude and longitude are stored as keyvalue 
attributes. A message in the system is an encapsulation of the multimedia data along with 




makes sure that the message does not get duplicated in any device. A timestamp, the time 
at which the multimedia content for the message created is also added as a part of the 
message. Source and destinations, MIME and format of the message are also added. 
       
            Figure 3.1. Message Format 
3.2. CHITCHAT 
In ChitChat, social interests can either be created or acquired. They are termed as 
direct and transient interests respectively. The following sections explain the two phases 
of ChitChat: 
1. Weight exchange phase 
For a given node, when a remote node falls in communication range, a connection 
attempt is initiated. Once the nodes are connected, the weight update algorithm is triggered 
for every pair of nodes. This algorithm works in three phases. Initially, the weights are 
decayed as per the decay model. Decayed weights are then shared and weights are finally 
updated as per growth model. As a result of this, interests of the connected devices can be 
acquired. The value of weight for acquired interests start to decline as per decay model 
when no other device with that interest is currently connected. Such interests are therefore 




2. Message routing phase 
Once the interests and weights are updated and shared, ChitChat’s routing 
algorithm determines the set of messages that need to be forwarded. The messages are 
forwarded to all those nodes which are either destinations or a subset of relays which have 
higher probability of delivering them to the destination, either directly or indirectly. The 
probability of a message getting delivered is a function of the sum of weights of individual 
interests mapped with the message. The proposed incentive algorithm is run on forwarding 
the messages within ChitChat to address uncooperative and selfish behavior. The details 
of this algorithm are explained in the following section.  
3.3. INCENTIVE MECHANISM 
The incentive mechanism begins with determining whether the connected node is 
an intermediate node or a destination. 
Based on whether the node has a direct social interest or transient social interest in 
the message, the node is classified as a relay or destination. If it is an intermediate node, 
an incentive calculation is done before forwarding the message. Subsequently, the message 
is forwarded to the connected node along with the promised value of reward equal to the 
calculated incentive. If the connected node is a destination, the message is forwarded and 
the incentive reward equal to the promise is collected. 
The mechanism works in such a way that an intermediate node is ensured an 
incentive it can receive when it forwards (may also add additional keywords) a message to 
the destination. The destination provides the promised incentive. Only a device which first 
delivers a message to the destination is given the incentive for that message. However, the 
devices can share a message with multiple destinations. 
The value of the promised incentive depends on factors such as the level of interest 
of the connected node in the content of the message, priority level of the message set by 
the source, size of the message, quality of the message and energy consumption of the 
connected devices. Some of these parameters are static whereas others are dynamic. 
Priority level of the message set by the source, size of the message and quality of the 




Interest level in message and energy consumption are dynamic as they are device 
dependents. 
A value of maximum incentive is predefined. A formula is used to calculate the 
value of promised incentive as a function of above parameters. The formula also ensures 
that the incentive promise for a message cannot exceed more than the maximum allowed 
value. Therefore, an incentive value for a message is either equal to or a fraction of the 
maximum incentive allowed. Figure 3.2 shows the data flow between two connected nodes.                                 
                     
                       Figure 3.2. Data Flow between Two Nodes 
Source generates a message and forwards it to the destinations and relays. Initially, 
all the devices are assigned the same initial value of incentive tokens before the data flow 
takes place. The devices can then utilize the allotted tokens to share content. A device with 




participated as an intermediary and is eventually left with zero incentive tokens to offer, it 
has to first participate as an intermediary to gain incentives.  
4. DTN IMPLEMENTATION 
The DTN application is designed to use Bluetooth communication in Android 
devices for sharing messages.  
Figure 4.1 shows a gallery screen where an image is already selected. A user of the 
application can generate a message by either clicking an image using camera or select an 
image from the gallery. In both cases, the user is provided with a set of keywords extracted 
from the image using Google Cloud Vision API. Following screens  
                




are shown to the user.  After the image is selected, the textbox gets automatically populated 
with the keywords by Google Cloud Vision API. A user can now edit the keywords and 
add more. Henceforth, these keywords act as interests for the user. When these keywords 
are saved using add tags button, a new message is created in the background which saves 
the added interests, the location where the keywords were edited/added and the timestamp 
of the image. Alternatively, the user could also click an image using camera screen. The 
flow in that case would be the same. 
Figure 4.2 shows the interests page. This page shows the user-interests using 
keywords, their weights and the MAC address of the device via which the device acquired 
the social interest. A value of SELF implies that the interest in the keyword is direct, 
otherwise it is indirect and hence, transient. 
Figure 4.3 shows a screen where two lists are displayed for nearby devices and 
connected devices. Two other devices were kept in communication range of the 
application. The screen shows that both the devices are nearby and also connected. There 
                  





might be other devices in range but they might not have the developed application installed. 
Such devices will be shown in nearby devices list but not under the list of connected 
devices.  
                  
         Figure 4.3. Neighbors Listing 
Figure 4.4 shows a screen where a list of received messages are displayed in a grid 
fashion. The images have caption as the path of the image. When a user clicks on any 
message, a message details screen is shown. The messages received were either destined 
for the device or to be forwarded so that it can relay the messages. This is determined by 




                      
             Figure 4.4. Received Messages 
Figure 4.5 shows a received message displayed as a combination of an image and 
it’s metadata tags such as Source MAC, Source Name, interests shown as keywords, 
latitude, longitude, and timestamp. Source MAC and source name identify the originator 
of the message in the network. Timestamp lets the destination node know when the 
message was generated. 
The application also has screens for checking the available incentives to offer and 
also to check the messages generated locally. There is also a screen that can be used to add 
interests manually. The operations mentioned in the architecture always run in the 
background. Every few minutes, neighboring nodes can be discovered by performing 
Bluetooth discovery. The energy overhead involved here cannot be eliminated as if a 
device has no clue to which devices are in the vicinity, it cannot initiate a connection 




This implies that if a device is already conducting transactions of data transfer, performing 
Bluetooth discovery may break the existing connections.  
                         
   Figure 4.5. Message Details 
 
To conquer this hindrance, a solution is devised which first checks if there are any 
transactions in process at the time discovery is scheduled. If this is true, Bluetooth 
discovery is delayed until the transactions are finished.  
5.DEMO SHOWN 
For a demo, three Android devices are taken, viz., devices A, B and C. This is to 




devices are given an incentive of 50 tokens. Device A is placed in the communication range 
of device B, whereas device B is kept in communication range of the device C.  
However, device A’s and device C’s Bluetooth range do not overlap. Bluetooth of 
devices A and B is now switched on. Initially, Device A is stored with 40 messages of 
varying sizes that device B is interested in. Bluetooth of devices A and B is switched on. 
When checked, B had received about 22 messages in total based on TSR values (messages 
whose TSR values were higher at B). Incentives are distributed next based on several 
factors such as TSR, energy used, priority etc. When the incentive screen is opened in 
Device B to check the incentives left, it is found that device B has zero reward to offer. 
Therefore, device B did not receive anymore messages from device A as it does not have 
any more incentives to offer.  
The interests of devices B and C are also kept exactly the same. Next, Bluetooth of 
device A is switched off and Bluetooth of C is switched on. B now shares the messages 
with C after it adds some more keywords to make these messages enriched in content. 
Device B has now obtained some incentives from C. Device A’s Bluetooth is turned on 
again. The remaining 18 messages are transferred to device B as it has now earned 
incentives. This demo shows that when B had no incentive value, it could not receive any 
more interesting messages. When C received 18 messages from B, it also adds additional 
keywords in some of the messages to enrich the message content.  
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper demonstrates the developed Android application implementing the 
proposed incentive mechanism for sharing data using ChitChat in DTN. An incentive 
mechanism has been implemented which prevents users from becoming selfish and 
motivates them to relay more content-rich messages. The application also bars selfish users 
from receiving data intended for them until they have enough incentives to pay for the 
messages. Currently the application is developed for Bluetooth and Android, and next it 
will be developed using WiFi Direct which is ad hoc wireless connection. It will also be 
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